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Abstract 
Since it was established in 1987 the NZCTU has consistently failed to successfully oppose and defeat any of the major 
policy initiatives ofthefowth Labow Government or the cwrent National Government, even though these policies have 
clearly been detrimental to the interests of workers. In particular, during the period leading up to the passage of the 
ECA in May 1991 the NZCIV leadership failed to organise and lead the kind of generalised strike action that would, 
at the very least, have forced the National Government to substantially amend (if not withdraw) the legislation. In the 
industrial relations literatwe there have been remarkably few attempts (apart from the self-justifications of those 
involved) to address the key question which this raises: why has the NZCTU leadership acted in such a conservative and 
timid manner in response to economic, social and industrial relations policies which are essentially pro-capitalist and 
anti-worker? Explanatory accounts of the conservatism of the NZCTIJ leadership, if they are to be convincing, must 
combine theoretical analysis of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of fulltime trade union officials in the 
industrial relations systems of advanced capitalism with systematic historical research which disentangles the concrete 
interplay of economic, class, ideological and political forces specific to any particular dispute. This paper outlines the 
theory of the contingent bweaucratic conservatism of fulltime trade union officials, considers some of the major 
criticisms of this theory, and then argues that a qualified version of this theory is essential to making sense of the role 
played by the NZCFU leadership in industrial relations. 
The NZC11.J was established as a united national trade 
union federation at its inaugural conference in October 
1987 bringing together, for the first time, the overwhelm-
ing majority of private and state sector unions. In terms of 
membership numbers and coverage as well as organisation 
and resources, the new federation was potentially the most 
powerful in New Zealand's labour history (Brosnan et al, 
1990: 102, 124-125). Yet despite the evident potential 
power of the new federation, the NZC11.J has consistently 
failed to suq;essfully oppose and defeat any of the major 
policy initiatives of the fourth Labour Government or the 
current National Government, even though these policies 
have been clearly detrimental to the interests of workers. 
In particular, during the period leading up to the passage of 
the ECA in May 1991 the NZC11.J leadership failed to 
organise and lead the kind of generalized strike action that 
would, at the very least, have forced the National Govern-
ment to substantially amend (if not withdraw) the legisla-
tion. 
In the industrial relations literature there have been re-
markably few attempts (apart from the self-justifications 
of those involved) to address the key questions which this 
rruses: 
• Why has the NZcru leadership acted in such a con-
servative and timid manner in response to economic, 
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social and industrial relations policies which are essen-
tially pro-capitalist and anti-worker? 
*In particular, why did the NZcru, despite the massive 
scale of working class opposition to the Employment 
Contracts Bill, completely fail to force the government 
to make any significant changes to the legislation? 
The central argument in this paper is that we cannot begin 
to answer these questions without reference to the theory 
of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of fulltime 
union officials (also know as the rank and filist perspec-
tive). Of course. bureaucratic conservatism is not the only 
factor which must be considered when investigating the 
course of particular industrial disputes and therefore it is 
always important to analyze the wider historical context of 
a dispute (state of the economy. prevailing balance of 
power between employers and workers, dominant eco-
nomic orthodoxy. policy agenda of the government, and so 
forth). Hence explanatory accounts of the conservatism of 
the NZCIU leadership, if they are to be convincing, must 
combine theoretical analysis of the contingent bureau-
cratic conservatism of full time trade union officials in the 
industrial relations systems of advanced capitalism with 
systematic historical research which disentangles the con-
crete interplay of economic, class, ideological and politi-
cal forces specific to any particular dispute. 
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This paper outlines the the<xy of the contingent bureau-
cratic conservatism of fulltime trade union officials con-
. ' Stders some of the major criticisms of this theory, and then 
argues that a qualified version of this theory is essential to 
~g s~nse of the role played by the NZCfU leadership 
m mdustrial relations. 
The contingent bureaucratic conservatism of 
fulltime trade union officials 
Following the identification of the trade union officialdom 
as a conservative social layer in the Webbs' classic 1 ndus-
trial Denwcracy which was published in 1897, there have 
been many attempts to explain the evidently conservative 
industrial and political practice of fulltime union offi-
cials.1 These span a wide range of intellectual and ideo-
logical perspectives from the revolutionary socialism of 
the classical Marxists to the liberal pluralism of British and 
American political science. Max Weber's analysis of 
bureaucracy and Robert Michels' study of the 'oligarchic 
tendencies of modern democracy' have been the major 
non-Marxist intellectual influences on the debate concern-
ing the conservative propensities of the trade union offi-
cialdom. Within the Marxist tradition there have been a 
number of different intetpretations of the contingent bu-
reaucratic conservatism of union officials by Marx and 
Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Gramsci and Trotsky. A 
comprehensive review of this literature is not possible 
within the limited confines of this paper (for useful reviews 
of the Marxist literature see, Clarke and Clements, 1977; 
Hyman, 1971; Kelly, 1988). Rather the paper will articu-
late and apply the theory of the bureaucratic conservatism 
of union officials developed within the Marxist tradition 
by, among others, Bramble (1993), Callinicos (1995), 
Cliff and Gluckstein (1986), and Richard Hyman (1971; 
1975) in his early work. 
Why do union officials act in a conservative and timid 
manner in industrial relations? For Michels the conserva-
tism of union officials reflected their desire to maintain the 
power and privileges ofleadership dominance within their 
organizations. In Political Parties he argued that oligar-
chical tendencies characterize all large scale organiza-
tions, whether trade unions or political parties, for three 
sets of reasons. First, there are the ' technical and adminis-
trative causes' of leadership dominance which arise be-
cause of the 'mechanical and technical impossibility of 
direct government by the masses' (1962, Part Q). Second, 
there are psychological causes of leadership dominance • 
which arise because there exists a 'natural greed for power' 
amongst leaders and 'the desire to dominate ... is universal ' 
(Ibid., pp205-6). In addition the masses are grateful to, 
and tend to venerate, their leaders. Third, there are 'intel-
lectual factors ' which undetpin leadership dominance. 
Leaders are generally intellecttJaJJy superior to the led and 
consequently the latter are dependent on the former. The 
dominance of the leadership rests on the ' incompetence of 
the masses'(1962, p.107-14). 
Not surprisingly in view of the conservative implications 
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that this kind of analysis has for industrial and political 
practice, Marxists have attempted to provide a more~ 
phisticated analysis of leadership dominance within trade 
unions which recognizes, not only the mechanisms which 
underpin leadership dominance, but also the mechanisms 
which can, in specific historical conjunctures, undennine 
it The most fundamental reason for the conservatism of 
full time union officials is the fact that their role in conduct-
~g negotiations and making compromises with employers 
IS dependent upon the continued existence of a social and 
economic system (capitalism) which centrally involves 
the subordination and exploitation of the workers they 
represen~ 2 Trade unions play a vital role in defending 
workers mterests within capitalism because they amelio-
rate this subordination and exploitation3, but generally 
they do nothing to seriously challenge it In particular, 
union officials will do everything in their power to avoid 
a 'head to head' confrontation with employers and the state 
in the form of a general strike. Of course this general 
theoretical analysis tells us very little about the actual 
behaviour of union officials in particular industrial dis-
putes: it cannot explain why in some disputes officials are 
prepared to sanction strike action while in others they do 
everything possible to avert it 
As Bramble (1993) makes clear. the theory of the contin-
gent bureaucratic conservatism of union officials rests on 
a number of core propositions. First, stable collective 
bargaining in advanced capitalist societies requires the 
development of a separate and specialised layer of fulltime 
officials within unions who negotiate the terms and condi-
tions of employment of union members. The bargaining 
functions of union officials are institutionalised and codi-
fied by the state in order to maintain the stability of capital-
labour relations. Second, fulltime union officials are di-
vorced from rank and ft.le members by conditions of work 
and pay, location in a bureaucratic hierarchy. and possibly 
geographic isolation. Third, this layer of officials develop 
an interest in maintaining their own relatively privileged 
position within the industrial relations system. Such 
officials will defend their own interests when they are 
threatened by employers, government or by their own 
members who refuse to recognise their legitimacy and 
authority. It is naive and unrealistic to assume that the 
interests of rank and ftle members. and the interests of the 
officials who represent them , will necessarily coincide. In 
fact, union officials will often not hesitate to sacrifice their 
members' interests in order to maintain their own. 
Fourth, rank and file control over officials varies tremen-
dously between individual unions. but generally it is weak 
and the effective accountability of officials to their mem-
bers is minimal. Generally, it is extremely difficult f<X 
union members to remove unpopular high ranking offi-
cials even in unions where these officials are formally 
elected. 
Fifth, the loyalty of union officials to established bargain-
ing relations leads them to support fonnal procedures 
associated with arbitration, mediation and collective bar-
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gaining and often to condemn industrial action, especially 
that which is not within its control. Full time union officials 
therefore constitute a conservative layer in tenns of indus-
trial p-actice, both in the demands that they are willing to 
sanction and in the methods that they are prepared to 
endorse in the pursuit of given demands. Because union 
officials, primary role within capitalism is collective bar-
gaining, involving negotiation and compromise, they will, 
unless subject to severe rank and file pressure, seek to 
avoid generalised strike action. Officials are solidly com-
mitted to refonnism and dming periods in history when the 
continued existence of capitalism is threatened by the 
emergence of a revolutionary movement they do every-
thing in their power to undermine the movement and 
defend the existing system. 
Finally, the bureaucratic conservatism of union officials is 
historically contingent because as a distinct social stratum, 
officials are subject to changing economic conditions and 
contradictory and conflicting sets of social forces. Offi-
cials are subject to pressure from below from their rank and 
file members and from above by frequently hostile em-
ployers and by government which generally sides with 
employers in significant industrial disputes. 
Let us consider this in a little more depth.4 Firs~ it is 
important to recognise that the tendency of fulltime offi-
cials to pursue a relatively conservative industrial practice 
is dependent upon the willingness of the members to 
support continued industrial peace in relations with em-
ployers. For the most part rank and flle members at least 
acquiesce in, if not actively support, their officials' indus-
trial practice. However, a shift of mood among rank and 
file members, either before or during an industrial dispute, 
may bring these members into conflict with their union 
leaders and the latter's workplace supporters. Rank and 
file pressure can force fulltime union officials to respond. 
The specific fonn that such a response may take is indeter-
minate. In some circumstances fulltime officials may seek 
to suppress the threat from below in order to preserve the 
status quo in form and substance. In others, they may seek 
to accommodate the pressure from below in order to 
preserve the substance ofleadership dominance. This may 
involve taking a more militant stance against employers. 
Unions are also subject to pressures from employers and 
the state, particularly during periods of economic crisis 
when employers are under pressure from declining profit 
rates and the state is under fiscal pressure. Declining 
profitability, particularly when labour productivity is not 
growing, places employers under acute pressure to cut 
labour costs. When the state is under fiscal pressure it is 
more likely to adopt a militant stance in negotiations with 
its employees. In short, the less favourable the economic 
envirorunent, the more pressure that is placed on union 
officials by employers and the state to accept sacrifices in 
members' wages and conditions in order to maintain the 
underlying viability of the system. Because of their loyalty 
to the capitalist system, it is likely that officials will 
acquiesce to employer demands. 
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To sum up. Fulltime trade union officials constitute a 
distinctive social stratum in capitalist societies with its 
own interests. Because of the bargaining fimctions that 
they perfonn within the industrial relations system, and 
because of their conditions of work and isolation from the 
rank and file, union officials tend towards conservatism in 
industrial practice-particularly during large scale indus-
trial disputes. It is important to recognise that the tendency 
towards bureaucratic conservatism within trade unions is 
precisely a tendency. There have been, and will continue to 
be, significant exceptions. Furthermore, bureaucratic con-
servatism is historically contingent since union officials 
are subject to contradictory, conflicting and changing sets 
of social, economic and political pressures. 
Criticisms of the theory 
The theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of 
full time trade union officials, commonly referred to as the 
'rank and filist perspective'. has been subject to extensive 
criticism (Heery and Fosh, 1990; Heery and Kelly, 1990; 
Hyman, 1989, ch.6; Kelly, 1988, ch.7; Zeitlin, 1987, 
1989a, 1989b ). The critics have argued that i) the con-
servatism of fulltirne union officials cannot be explained 
by reference to the specific nature of officials' working 
lives nor their involvement in collective bargaining; ii) 
there is no clear divergence of interests between the trade 
union officialdom and the rank and flle; iii) there is no clear 
dividing line between the 'officialdom' or 'union bureauc-
racy ' and the rank and file; iv) union officials are, contrary 
to the claims of rank and filists, actually responsive to the 
wishes of rank and flle members; and v) full time officials 
do not necessarily tend to conservatism and rank and flle 
members to militancy. In this section of the paper these 
criticisms will themselves be subject to critical scrutiny. 
Kelly (1988) argues that the conservatism of fulltime 
union officials cannot be explained by reference to the 
specific nature of officials' working lives which generally 
involve higher pay and greater employment security than 
that experienced by union members, geographic and or-
ganizational isolation from rank and file members, and the 
power and prestige associated with union leadership. In 
particular. the higher rate of pay that some officials get 
relative to the workers that they represent cannot be a 
factor explaining officials' conservatism since high paid 
workers can be industrially militant and low paid workers 
quiescent (ibid., pp. 161-65). 
In response the more sophisticated rank and filists accept 
that there is no mechanical relationship between high or 
low wages and high or low rates of industrial militancy 
amongst sections of the workforce. Rather, they argue that, 
regardless of whether or not an official earns more than 
rank and flle members, the overall effect of official work-
ing conditions is to isolate them from those they represent 
(Bramble, 1993, pp. 17-21). As Callinicos observes: 
[the official] is removed from the discipline of the shop 
floor, from its dirt and dangers, from the immediate 
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conflicts with the foreman and manger, from the fel-
lowship of his [or her] workmates, to the very different 
environment of an office. Even if he [or she] is not paid 
more than his [or her] members, his [or her] earnings no 
longer depend on the ups and downs of capitalist 
production... If a plant is closed, the official who 
negotiates the redundancies will not get the sack. 
Constantly closeted with management, the official 
comes to see negotiation, compromise, the reconcilia-
tion of capital and labour as the very stuff of trade 
unionism. Struggle appears as a disruption of the 
bargaining process, a nuisance and an inconvenience, 
which may threaten the accumulated fimds of the union 
(cited in Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986, p.27). 
The point is that it is not simply the high salaries of union 
officials in national leadership positions that predisposes 
them to conservatism in industrial practice, but rather that 
this is the overall effect of their working conditions (geo-
graphic and organizational isolation, lack of accountabil-
ity, commitment to established bargaining procedures, 
and so forth). 
Critics of the theory of bureaucratic conservatism argue 
that the rank and filist perspective is empirically un-
founded because there is no clear dividing line between the 
'officialdom' and the rank and file. The internal organiza-
tional hierarchies of unions are highly complex and there 
is a high deg~ee of variation in organizational structure 
between individual unions; consequently the division be-
tween the officialdom and the rank and file is blurred. 
Further, the interests of the union officials and of the rank 
and file are not uniform and both are divided internally as 
well as against one another (Hyman, 1989, p.158; Kelly, 
1988, pp.154-155; Zeitlin, 1989a, p. 49). Rather than there 
being a clearly defined bureaucracy separate from a coher-
ent and conscious rank and file, intra-union relations are 
highly complex, with shifting interest groups and bureau-
cratic tendencies apparent at many levels. In this vein 
Hyman has argued that "the problem of 'bureaucracy' 
denotes not so much a distinct stratum of personnel as a 
relationship which permeates the whole practice of trade 
unionism" (1989, p.158). 
In reality it is true that there is no simple and clear cut 
distinction between the rank and file and the union official-
dom. Unions have complex bureaucratic organisational 
structures which can encompass ordinary rank and file 
members, unpaid wolk:place delegates, elected regional 
executive members, regionally based paid organisers, and 
fulltime national officers (President, Vice-President, Sec-
retary, etc ). The demarcation problems involved in distin-
guishing between the union officialdom and the rank and 
file arise when one moves down the union hierarchy to 
regional organizers, elected unpaid regional office hold-
ers, and workplace delegates. 5 In general, the tendency to 
bureaucratic conservatism is stronger the higher up the 
union hierarchy (although, obviously, there are excep-
tions). For example, regional organizers are more likely to 
be responsive to rank-and-file demands than national 
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officers. However, regional organizers are typically bu-
reaucratically appointed and are dependent for their posi-
tions on the continued patronage of the national leader-
ship. This paper is primarily concerned with the conserva-
tism of the NZCIU leadership, and there can be no doubt 
that the members of theNZCIU' s National Executive, and 
other national officers of unions who are based in Welling-
ton, are 'union bureaucrats' in the classical sense. 
The rank and filists argue that, despite the organisational 
complexity of some unions, and the existence of other 
sources of intra-union conflict, there is still a discernible 
divergence of interests between the working-class mem-
bership of trade unions and fulltime office based officials 
(Bramble, 1993, p.17). This divergence of interests arises 
because the driving force of economic activity in capitalist 
society is, given the competitive war which is waged on 
both commodity and capital markets, the necessity of 
firms to remain profitable. Profit in capitalist society is the 
principal, but not the only, phenomenal fonn assumed by 
surplus-value. Surplus-value is the monetary form of the 
social surplus product specific to a capitaHst society. In 
other words, workers produce a surplus product over and 
above their own subsistence needs, and the exchange-
value of this swplus product is equivalent to surplus-value. 
The surplus-value produced by workers in capitalist pro-
duction is appropriated by capitalists by virtue of their 
exclusive ownership (in the sense of effective control) of 
the means of production.6 Hence the divergence of 
interests between rank and fJ.le union members and union 
officials arises because "the task of trade unions ... is to 
defend worlcers' interests within capitalist relations of 
production, within the wages system. The unions exist to 
improve the terms on which the wmker is exploited, not to 
put an end to exploitation." (Cliff & Gluckstein, 1986, 
p.26) 
Agreements reached between unions and employers 
through collective bargaining within capitalism. even 
where such agreements involve substantial improvements 
in wages and conditions, only have a marginal impact on 
the overall process of surplus-extraction (and hence never 
fully reali:re workers ' interests). The interests of union 
officials are inextricably linked to the continued mainte-
nance oflegislation codifying agreements reached through 
collective negotiation of the buying and selling of labour 
power, which inturn depends upon the continued subordi-
nation and exploitation of workers within the production 
process. In short, collective ag~eements may be reached 
with employers which do reflect, to a limited and partial 
extent, workers ' desire for higher wages and better condi-
tions of employment But they can never more than par-
tially encompass workers' interests because workers have 
fundamental interests (inter alia securing the full 'fruits of 
their labour', distributing this according to need rather 
than profit, and democratic workplace control) which are 
essentially anti-capitalist 
Zeitlin argues that the rank and filist perspective is inad-
equate because there is 'pervasive evidence' tilat fulltime 
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officials are actually responsive to the wishes of rank and 
file members, with the result that it has been possible "to 
keep internal tensions within tolerable bounds" (1989~ 
pp.58-9) This criticism has some force against simplified 
versions of the rank and filist perspective, but not against 
those which recognise that the conservatism of officials is 
contingent because they are subject to contradictory and 
contlicting social f<rees, the relative weight of which can 
change rapidly over time. In unions with a high deg~ee of 
internal democracy and rank and file participation in union 
affairs, or dming industrial disputes where the rank and file 
is placing considenlble pressure on their officials to act, the 
officials may be responsive to rank and file demands. But 
the weight of historical evidence suggests that dming large 
scale industrial disputes union officials tend to adopt a 
more conservative posture than the rank and file (see foc 
example, Bramble, 1993; Camnicos & Symonds, 1985; 
Cliff & Gluckste~ 1986; Hannan, 1988; Moody, 1988; 
Kerry, 1980; Robertson, 1988). 
Perhaps the most common, and apparently damming, 
criticism of the rank and filist perspective, is the claim that 
fulltime officials do not necessarily tend to conservatism 
and members to militancy. This appears to be a powerful 
criticism because it is obviously not the case that members 
are always more militant than officials. Indeed. much of 
the time it is true that rank and file union members are 
passive, quiescent and content to support the position of 
their officials. Ideologically, the majority of the member-
ship make actually be more conservative than the official-
dom. It is difficult to articulate a sophisticated response to 
this, particularly important criticism, in the limited con-
fines of this paper (Bramble provides the definitive re-
sponse, 1993, pp.27-33). 
In response three brief points are worth emphasizing. First, 
workers' structural location within the economic structure 
of capitalism means that they are subject to periodic 
attacks by employers on their wages and conditions of 
employment Rank and file workers experience these 
attacks much more immediately than union officials who 
are shielded from them for the reasons outlined above. 
Secon~ related to this, 
many unionized workers with experience of industrial 
action share a common frame of reference whose 
elements form a basic class consciousness. lbese in-
clude: the need for workers to stick together. an antipa-
thy to the boss and those who would break strikes, a 
suspicion of the role of police on picket lines, and an 
understanding that workers can only protect what they 
have (or improve on it) by being prepared to fight Such 
notions are especially likely to come to the fore in 
periods of collective industrial action. when workers 
are engaged in what Gramsci called ' the practical 
transformation of the real world' (Bramble, 1993:30). 
Thir~ during large scale industrial disputes workers • 
consciousness changes very rapidly over short periods of 
time. Bramble argues in this regard that 
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industrial action by trade unionists has a powerful 
effect in stimulating workers' consciousness of the 
identity and power of their class. The struggle of rank 
and file union members has a tendency to break from 
the legal channels sanctioned by fulltime officials, not 
least because members have no material attachment to 
the fonnal procedures of industrial relations. Thus, 
once mobilised and once conscious of the issues at 
stake, rank and file members can be rapidly driven into 
industrial action extending well beyond what their 
fulltime officials are willing to sanction. Sharp swings 
of membership sentiment can occur with great rapid-
ity. from docility and acquiescence to aggression and 
confidence and back again, and it is in the fluidity of 
members· consciousness that they stand in contrast to 
fulltime officials (Ibid. p 31). 
As this makes clear, much criticism of the rank and file 
perspective is misdirected. This perspective recognizes 
that in most unions, most of the time, the rank and fJle 
members may be passive, quiescent and ideologically 
more conservative than their officials. However, during 
large scale strikes, and a fortiori during periods of gener-
aliud strike action, union officials' commitment to the 
formal procedures of collective bargaining, negotiation 
and compromise with employers leads them to seek to 
avert 'head to head' confrontation with employers and the 
state. At the same time, when engaged in large scale 
collective action even ideologically conservative workers 
can become radicaliud in a very short period of time and 
support fonns of industrial action being actively discour-
aged by ostensibly 'left wing • officials. 
It must be acknowledged that socialist explanations of' sell 
outs' by union officials that focus on their political alle-
giances of union officials, or their predisposition to per-
sonal conuption, are unsatisfactory. They typically invoke 
a conspiratorial rather than sociological fonn of explana-
tion. This criticism is sound but it does not seriously 
undermine the rank and filist perspective because this 
perspective does not explain sell-outs by reference to 
personal deficiencies of individuals. 
Finally, the rank and fllist perspective has been criticised 
for focusing excessively on internal conflict within unions 
and failing to place sufficient weight on the frequently 
hostile external social, economic and political context in 
which unions have to operate. Once again this criticism is 
wide of the mark. Rank and filists readily acknowledge 
that when considering any specific dispute. particularly 
where the union has lost, it is important not to focus 
exclusively on the role of the union officials. It is necessary 
to place the dispute within a wider societal and historical 
context (see for example, Roper, 1990). 
Relevance of the theory to the NZCTU 
The theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of 
the union officialdom both explains, and is empirically 
corroborated by, the largely timid, passive, conciliatory, 
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and conservative response of the NZCIU leadership to the 
succession of attacks on its members by the fourth Labour 
Government and the current National Government. While 
it is not possible to provide a detailed empirically grounded 
account of the performance of theNZCIU leadership from 
1987 to the present, it is possible to make a number of 
general observations. 
First, industrially the NZCI1J leadership has repeatedly 
emphasized the need for negotiation and compromise 
within the formal procedures of collective bargaining, 
while demonstrating a complete distain for industrial ac-
tion. On numerous occasions the larger unions affiliated to 
the NZCI1J have negotiated collective agreements with 
employers which maintain the union' s role as the workers' 
representative in collective bargaining at the expense of 
major concessions on pay rates, conditions of employ-
ment, and redundancies. In other words, union officials 
have been prepared to sacrifice the interests of their mem-
bers in order to preserve their own mediating role in the 
industrial relations system. Further, the NZCI1J has 
consistently failed to c<HJrdinate and lead widespread 
strike action in opposition to either the specific attacks of 
militant employers or the pro-capitalist, anti-worker poli-
cies of the Labour and National governments. 
Second, politically the NZCI1J leadership pursued a so-
cial democratic 'corporatist' strategy emphasizing COOJr 
eration with, rather than opposition to, the fourth Labour 
Government This strategy was pushed by the leadership 
in the conflict surrounding the proposed Compact between 
the NZCI1J and the Labour Government which culmi-
nated in the notorious 'Growth Agreement' reached six 
weeks prior to the 1990 general election. 7 Following the 
election of the National Government in 1990 the NZCTIJ 
leadership has constantly emphasized its preparedness to 
work cooperatively with the government, and astonish-
ingly in October of 1991 invited a National Prime Minis-
ter, Jim Bolger, to speak at its biennial conference. 
Thir<L even in terms of its formal structure the democratic 
accountability of the NZCfU leadership to its rank and file 
members is minimal Unlike the FOL which held annual 
conferences, the NZCfU only holds conferences on a 
biennial basis. The President, Vice President and Secre-
tary /Treasurer are only subject to election once every four 
years (less frequently than the Prime Minister!), there is no 
effective constitutional mechanism enabling rank and file 
NZCfU members to remove the President or Vice Presi-
dent from office for inadequate performance, there is no 
constitutional requirement for union officials to vote in 
accord with the wishes of the majority of their members in 
special meetings of affiliates, nor is there any constitu-
tionalrequirement that affiliated unions be internally demo-
cratic (NZCfU, 1994, pp.49-73). 
The performance of the NZCI1J leadership in response to 
the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill (and 
associated changes in the eligibility criteria for welfare 
benefits) constitutes a classical case of bureaucratic con-
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servatism. It was widely recognized fium the outset that 
the central provisions of the Employment Contracts Act 
would fundamentally undennine union membership and 
covera~e, organization, collective action and bargaining 
power. The ECB was introduced in conjunction with 
significant reductions in benefit rates and the introduction 
of much harsher eligibility criteria (Boston and Dalziel, 
1992). Early in 1991 the popularity of National, as re-
flected in opinion polls, declined to an historic low for a 
governing party. In this context, during the early months of 
1991 there was a remarkable, and largely spontaneous, 
growth of working class opposition to the legislation. The 
overwhelming weight of the available evidence suggests 
that a clear majority of rank and file union members 
supported generalized strike action in order to force the 
government to amend or withdraw the bill. This is clear 
from the scale of the protests against the bill (the largest 
since 1981), the size and mood of mass stopwork: meetings, 
opinion polls which highlighted the unpopularity of the 
ECB, and the results of union ballots endorsing nation-
wide strike action (Heal~ 1994, ch.5; and Heal in this 
volume). 
The NZCIU leadership has, rather like a scratched record, 
subsequently claimed that there was insufficient rank and 
file support for a 24 hour general strike in opposition to the 
ECB; but it has not produced a scrap of reliable evidence 
to support this claim. There is not a single instance amongst 
the major unions of workers failing to endorse, and by very 
large majorities, strike action where they were balloted. 
A 24 hour general strike on its own would not have been 
sufficient to force the government to amend the legisla-
tion.9 But a successful general strike would have raised 
workers ' confidence and could have been followed by 
further generalized strike action and mass protests. In the 
face of such opposition it is likely that the government 
would have, at the vesy least, modified the legislation in 
order diffuse the situation (it was subsequently forced into 
U-tums on some of its initiatives in superannuation and 
health). Consequently, the decision of the Special Affili-
ates conference held on the 18th of April1991 represents 
one of the darkest days in New Zealand's labour history. 
The national office holders in major unions block voted 
against the Service Workers' amendment calling for a 24 
hour nation-wide strike, even though the majority of rank 
and file members in these unions would have endorsed and 
supported such action. Instead of promoting strike action 
to defeat the legislation, the NZCfU leadership constantly 
emphasized compromise, negotiation, conciliation and the 
powerlessness of workers. It was a 'sell out' of consider-
able political and historical significance. If the National 
Government had been defeated on this issue, then it would 
have effectively slowed down the continued implementa-
tion of the policy agenda of the New Right 
Finally, the argument in this section of the paper raises an 
apparent anomaly: if the distinctive interests of the union 
officialdom rest in the maintenance of their role in collec-
tive bargaining, and the ECB undermined collective bar-
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gaining, then why didn't NZClU leadership oppose the 
ECB m<Xe forcefully? The major reason is that the posi-
tions, power and salaries of the members of the NZCIU 
National Executive were in no way directly threatened by 
the ECB. The union officialdom is not homogeneous and 
there is a differentiation of interests within it In essence, 
in failing to coordinate a nation-wide campaign of gener-
alized strike action in ~sition to the legislation, the 
NZCIU leadership was sacrificing the interests, not only 
of the rank and file, but also sections of the union official-
dom. 
What is to be done? 
Fust, in response to the NZCIU' s continual emphasis on 
the powerlessness of workers, it must be emphasized that 
workers do have the capacity to win major concessions 
from employers and the state through strike action. By 
comparison, policy submissions to the current government 
are an exercise in futility and simply waste limited union 
resources. 
Second, while it is the case that workers have the collective 
capacity to force employers and the state to make major 
concessions, this is dependent upon the extensive mobili-
zation of the rank and file and the degree of rank and file 
pressure on their officials. As we have seen, officials 
generally want to settle disputes as soon as possible, even 
if this involves reaching agreements which make unneces-
sary concessions to employers. Consequently, rank and 
file activists need to constantly argue for the maximwn 
degiee possible of rank and file involvement in the organ-
izing of the strike and in the negotiation process. In view 
of its past track record. the intervention of the NZCfU 
leadership in any particular dispute should be viewed with 
supreme distrust 
Third, the NZCIU requires thorough democratization. 
Conferences should be held annually, national office hold-
ers should be subject to annual re-election, and so forth. 
Fourth, during the 1990s there has been a significant 
revival in strike activity internationally. There has also 
been a revival of strike activity in New Zealand from the 
low point following the introduction of the ECA in 1991. 
It is time the NZCI1J started to build a campaign of 
political and industrial action in order to force the govern-
ment to, at the very least, amend the ECA. 
Fifth, without suggesting that changing leading personnel 
will have anything other than a marginal impact on the 
bureaucratic conservatism of the NZCTIJ leadership, the 
cmrent office holders have shown themselves to be stag-
gering inept in opposing militant employers and anti-
working class policies and they should be replaced. Sixth, 
the promotion of business unionism and workplace reform 
by the Engineers' Union (the most right-wing and reac-
tionary in New Zealand) and the NZCTIJ leadership must 
be vigorously opposed by rank and file activists. 
Fmally, the revitalization of the union movement in New 
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Zealand is ultimately dependent upon a major revival of 
rank and file activity and militancy. This is, intum, will 
only happen in the context of a major upsmge in working 
class struggle. The task for rank and file activists and 
socialists is to help build that struggle while simultane-
ously highlighting the propensity of union officials to 
sabotage it 
Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper has been to highlight 
the relevance of the theocy of the contingent bureaucratic 
conservatism of trade union officials to the study of indus-
trial relations in New Zealand. Specifically, the theory 
provides a convincing explanation of the timidity, con-
servatism and ineffectiveness of the NZCIU leadership's 
responses to the attacks of militant employers and anti-
working class policies. It is simplistic and false to assert 
that 'officials always sell out' their rank and file members. 
One of the major strengths of the theory is its capacity to 
identify not only the mechanisms which can, in specific 
historical conjunctmes, undennine it. By recognising that 
the bureaucratic conservatism of union officials is contin-
gent, the theory provides an analytical frameworlc of 
considerable sophistication and explanatory power which 
can be used to guide historical and empirical research in 
the related fields of industrial relations and labour history. 
Future research 
The struggle against the ECA in 1991 ranks alongside the 
1890 Maritime Strike, 1913 Waterfront Strike, and the 
1951 Waterfront Lockout as one of the most significant in 
New Zealand's labour history. Up to this point, Heal's MA 
thesis constitutes the most detailed historical account of 
the struggle for and against the ECA. While this work 
makes an invaluable contribution, there remain many 
avenues open for further research into the 'making of the 
ECA'. There is a need for detailed historical accounts of 
the struggle in the various regions, that is regional case 
studies. 
Alternatively it would be useful to obtain accounts of the 
struggle focusing on the roles played by particular unions, 
focusing not just on the officials in these unions but also the 
rank and flle. Adopting this kind of detailed case study 
approach might make it possible, if supplemented by in 
depth interviews with rank and flle union members, to 
trace the way in which rank and file sentiment changed 
during the early months of 1991. 
Heal's research could also be usefully supplemented by a 
more detailed account of the changing position of the 
NZCTIJ leadership and 'inside' accounts of the response of 
employers (NZBR & NZEF) and the National Cabinet to 
the spontaneous upsurge of working class anger early in 
1991. More generally future research is required in both 
labour history and industrial relations which adopts a rank 
and filist perspective. 
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Notes 
1 The term 'conservative' is used to designate attachment 
to the existing patterns of social, economic and political 
relations associated with advanced capitalism. Whenever 
working class struggle has seriously threaten the contin-
ued existence of capitalism (for example, Germany 1918-
1923, Italy 1919-1920, France 1968) trade union officials 
have consistently defended capitalism. 'Conservatism' 
with respect to industrial practice refers to commitment to 
negoitation and compromize rather than struggle. 
2 The term 'exploitation' is used here in the Marxian 
sense. Workers are exploited because they produce a 
surplus product over and above that required to meet their 
basic needs _for subsistence which is appropriated by a 
dominant capi ta1ist class (for references see Roper, 1993). 
3 Richard Hyman observes in this regard that: .. Because 
the economic power of capital- reinforced by a battery of 
legal sanctions - is so ~ the amount of control which 
can be exen:ised by employees as individuals is extremely 
limited. Only when they band together in common action 
can they begin to make serious inroads into the dominance 
of the employer." (1975:32) 
4 The following paragraph paraphrases Bramble, 1993: 
39-40. 
5 If one must draw a demarcation 'line' between the rank 
and file and the union officialdom, then a key considera-
tion is whether or not a position is paid or unpaid. and if it 
~ 
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is paid then by whom (in Britain some shop stewards are 
paid by their employer while working fulltime on union 
business). As a general rule all full time paid union officials 
form part of the union bureaucracy, but it must be 
recognized that the bureaucracy, like the rank and file, is 
not homogeneous. 
6 For a more detailed outline of this argument and 
extensive references, see Roper, 1993:12-21. 
7 For an account that is sympathetic to the NZCIU 
position see Harvey, 1992. For a critique see Heal, 1994, 
eh. 3. 
8 This has been borne out by subsequent research focusing 
on the impact of the ECA. Numerous references could be 
provided here. For a representative sample see the contri-
butions to Harbridge,1993 and the New Zealand Journal 
of Industrial Relations, vol 16, no. 2 . 
9 Given the breadth and depth of popular opposition to the 
government at the time, it is possible that key sections of 
the workfon:e may have stayed out longer than 24 hours. 
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